With Deep Disagreement

Applied to indirect cases of deep disagreement, Wittgenstein`s theory will tell us that the young creationist of Earth Henry and the new atheist Richard are indirectly deeply at odds over whether P (about the fact that this particular rock is much older than 6000 years, say, millions of years older) only if they really disagree on P, and their disagreement with P forces them – whether logical, probabilistic or epistemic – to disagree on a pivotal obligation H, say that the Earth existed in the distant past (e.B. it existed millions of years ago before humans existed). In this case, the commitment makes sense: Henry and Richard disagree on whether the rock is more than 6,000 years old, which logically forces them not to agree on whether the earth existed in the distant past, thus understood. But it can also be epistemic. To see this, consider this: While I don`t see the problems Wittgenstein`s theory faces as reversed objections, I think it motivates people to explore other options. In this section, I would like to look at a very similar account of deep disagreements. According to this report of deep disagreements, there is a close connection between deep disagreements and epistemic principles. However, I think there is room to explain how some disagreements about whether I have hands are a deep disagreement. First, a distinction must be made between what Thompson Clarke (1972) called simple doubts and indistinct doubts, such as.

B cases where someone doubts the existence of his hands after an experiment or surgery (cf. Clarke 1972, p. 758). In these cases, doubts arise in their worldviews – these doubts have an intuitive meaning in the light of their worldview (cf. Stroud 1984, chap. 3-5). These are the simple doubts. Vague doubts are doubts not only about a statement or group of statements, but about an entire field or worldview.

Footnote 13 In such cases, the assertion that I have hands is considered representative of an entire field, for example, that there are physical things independent of the mind where disagreements about having hands are representative of the wider range. Footnote 14 Christensen D (2007) Epistemology of disagreement: the good news. Philos Rev 116(2):187-217 Do these two cases problematize the idea that perseverance cannot be easily explained by the idea that the best reasons that challengers can offer for their basic epistemic principles are epistemically circular, so that the reasons put forward by the parties to the dispute would raise the question against each other? In principle, yes, but in practice no. In principle, they do so, because if such reasons are available – that is, reasons based on claims or transcendental – then they should allow the opposing parties to reach an agreement, as they are in principle felt on both sides. In practice, they will not be accessible to the ordinary non-philosopher because they will know nothing about them. In return, they will not be available as reasons for the exchange. In this way, the actual persistence of deep disagreements can easily be explained by the basic epistemic theory of principles. Now, one might think that two people who disagree on (R) are forced to accept different basic epistemic principles, perhaps basic moral-epistemic bridge principles, such as principles that combine an epistemic condition with the attribution of moral attributes (e.B intuition establishes moral attribution; or God`s commandments establish moral attribution). If the parties to the dispute accept different basic epistemic principles, and this is why the disagreement is profound, then the disagreement on (R) will be an indirect deep disagreement. There is a direct and profound disagreement on these principles of moral-epistemic bridge.

The problem with this answer is that it turns deep moral disagreements into deep epistemic disagreements: there are no direct deep disagreements about moral principles as such, but about epistemic principles. Moreover, it could simply be that each disputant (R) simply approves or denies without any epistemic reason guiding him: perhaps there is only one causal explanation for his acceptance or rejection of (R). The same argument can be put forward mutatis mutandis for certain axiological and aesthetic disagreements. Note that most of the hinge bonds that Brueckner lists are epistemic principles, but not all. For example, that there is an outside world, that I am not a brain in a vat and that the earth has more than three minutes. One can imagine expanding the list to suit other plausible candidates (see Coliva 2015). Wittgenstein himself mentions more: the deep differences of opinion are to some extent insoluble. It`s not that Amy is unable to follow Ben`s arguments or that she`s generally insensitive to the evidence. On the contrary, Amy has a set of beliefs that isolate her exactly from the kind of evidence that would be crucial to showing that she is wrong.

No line of reasoning or reasoning that Ben could honestly present to Amy would convince her rationally. What should their answer look like? Should they approach disagreement with the same intellectual humility as Frank and Gita who rationally take the fact that they disagree as good proof that someone has made a mistake? Examining the depth of disagreements will show the seriousness of the problem. Why don`t we agree with valid and recognizable facts when we all live in the same world, we have pretty much the same cognitive abilities, and, at least in the Western world, most people have pretty easy access to pretty much the same information? The third challenge concerns the desideratum of disagreement. The problem is that there are many theories about hinge obligations, and therefore many ways to answer the constitutional question (what is the nature of what we disagree on in case of deep disagreement?) and the question of attitude (what is the nature of our attitude to what we disagree on in case of deep disagreement?) . . . . .